Carnage And Culture: Landmark Battles In The Rise Of Western Power (2002) - Plot & Excerpts
"Carnage and Culture" is, in my eyes, an example of essentialist history done badly.So, first I'll just briefly address what I mean by "essentialist": That is when the historian claims to have discovered some essence that define and explain whatever is being discussed. This is clearly both a legitimate and an extremely useful approach - but only if actually true.When done badly, the historian cherry picks only the empirical evidence which fits the essentialist thesis and discards all countervailing evidence. Hanson's book is an example of this, and even more glaring as it doesn't do much to justify this sorting process.In short, some of my the central issues with Hanson's book are:A) Hanson assumes a set of "Western values" which are supposed to remain (somewhat) constant for 2.500 years... ('nough said)B) He is cherry picking his battles to a disturbing degree. Note his lack of battles between 216 BC and 732 AD and then again between 732 and 1521, and once again between 1571 and 1879.C) His idea that non-Western peoples do not engage in head-on combat, thereby being less lethal is... well puzzling. Note the lethal effectivenes of Mongol and Ottoman horse archers in defeating "Western" armies on several occasions (and also that Hanson dismisses both Ghenghis Khan and Tamerlane in two paragraphs on page 275...)D) His postulate that "Western" armies in the ancient world and middle ages were based on capitalism and freedom is baffling.E) His definition of "the West" is quite vague.F) His claims such as the one that "Western" armies "were better fed, equipped, and armed by those who saw profit in war." (pp. 275) is patently wrong, at least before sometime in the (latter) 19th century.The problem with Hanson's argument becomes obvious even if one only looks at the table of contents, specifically his choice of battles:480 BC (Salamis)331 BC (Gaugamela)216 BC (Cannae)732 AD (Tours/Poitiers)1521 AD (Tenochtitlan)1571 AD (Lepanto)1879 AD (Rorke's Drift)1942 AD (Midway)1968 AD (Tet)Note the two massive gaps (216BC-732 AD & 732AD-1521AD) and one smaller one (1571AD-1879AD). Note also that Hanson in a book on "Western" warfare manage to completely avoid the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which gave rise to the modern European conscript army (levée en masse), as well as the Wars of Religion which were central in creating professional standing armies and introducing the "gunpowder revolution" in Europe.What Hanson's curious selection of battles does is allowing him to avoid periods of European history where his "Western" way of war thesis obviously fails.These are in particular:- Warfare of Imperial Rome and late antiquity (lots of mercenaries, lack of the "free citizenry" of Hanson's "West)- The middle ages (particularly chivalry and the crusades with their emphasis on "irrational" elements such as religion and morals)- Renaissance warfare in Italy (the heavy reliance on condottieri and their reluctance to risk their "assets", i.e. mercenaries, in decisive battles lead to a circumspection in warfare that would place them as "Eastern" or at least "non-Western" by Hanson's definition)- The Wars of Religion (again, religious warfare sits ill with Hanson's definition of "Western" warfare)- The so-called "Kabinettskriege" of the early modern era (the great "new monarchies" of Europe and their dynastic wars for limited goals don't sit well with Hanson's notion that decisive victory and conquest is the hallmark of "Western" warfare).Also, in both Salamis and Midway, Hanson's "Western" protagonists used the kind of circumspection he seems elsewhere to consider a hallmark of "non-Western" warfare (the Greek commander tricking both his own and the Persian forces to achieve an advantageous position, the US attempting to "ambushing the ambusher" being forewarned by decrypted Japanese orders).Likewise, by choosing the Battle of Cannae, Hanson gets a "snapshot" of the Roman legionary army during a very short time in which at which it most resembled the armies of today, i.e. after the Marian reforms removed property qualifications, but before the Imperial Roman army began heavy recruitment among the Germanic peoples for legionaries. Not to mention that what rescued the Romans from the defeat at Cannae, the resilience and effectiveness of the Roman recruitment and alliance system, would probably seem rather foreign to Hanson's beloved Greeks...The choice of the Battle of Tours/Poitiers seems to me as if Hanson is merely rehashing the opinion of Edward Gibbon that this obscure and extremely poorly documented battle (both its time and place are in dispute) saved Europe from becoming Muslim. Again, not something which increase my confidence in an already dubious thesis.The renaissance battles chosen by Hanson (Tenochtitlan & Lepanto) are likewise telling: He avoids the numerous wars between Italian city states whose circumspection and reliance on mercenaries don't fit his "Western way of war" scenario and instead get a nice "conquering West" scenario, which omits the numerous Ottoman successes.In Tenochtitlan, it should also be noted both that Cortez barely escaped with his life and that his small force was multiplied many times over by the addition of the Aztec's local enemies; subject peoples of the Aztec empire who used the arrival of Cortez to further a rebellion.Then Hanson skips the entire 17th and 18th centuries to (cherry) pick the Battle of Rorke's Drift.I can't help to wonder if this is merely because Hanson has once watched the film "Zulu" (starring Michael Caine), because just like Tours, Rorke's Drift seems an extremely odd choice.Even were we to follow Hanson's cherry picking approach, why not select the Battle of the Pyramids (1798) instead? Here at least we have a major battle in which the pinnacle of Enlightenment and Revolutionary military might, Napoleon's French army, defeats an unquestionably non-Western army (the Mamluks) in open battle. Instead we get a minor British force using superior firearms from an entrenched position against an opponent with far less advanced weapons.Rorke's Drift is also an ironic choice, since apparently the Zulu king had warned his commanders NOT to engage heavily entrenched British troops. So, if anything, it's an example of a rogue commander as well as the line from Hillaire Belloc's "The Modern Traveller": "Whatever happens we have got; The Maxim gun and they have not" (okay, that had to wait until the Battle of Omdurman, but the principle is there with the rapid fire Martini-Henry rifles and Gatling guns of the Zulu War as well).In addition, I feel tempted to insert a reverse example: The New Zeeland Land Wars in which the Maori, often outnumbered as well as outgunned, successfully fought British troops from their heavily fortified pās, earthwork forts capable of withstanding even British artillery.I've seen another commenter highlighting that the entire book may actually be a lead up to the final chapter on Vietnam with its conservative interpretation that "we could have, should have, and actually did win" interpretation. It comes as a sort of "reverse catharsis": The ultimate betrayal of the (decisive, heroic, yet collegial) "Western" way of war in the face of those sneaky "Easterners" with their inferior guerilla tactics and the home front/liberal media "stabbing our GIs in the back".I also think that Hanson is quite alone with his "the domino theory was right after all" interpretation.As to Hanson's suggestion of a US invasion of North Vietnam, that's just laughable: Has Hanson forgotten a very nice template for the consequences, i.e. MacArthur's drive into North Korea and almost to the Yalu and what happened due to that?Finally, It ought to be pretty obvious to any reasonably historically well-read person to perceive the highly problematic central theme in the book: That some essentially "Western" values stretch seamlessly from Ancient Greece to the Pentagon.I've already mentioned that Hanson shoehorns and/or ignores anything that won't fit his ideas (read: bias), and one glaring example is his curious dismissal of Genghis Khan and the Mongols along with Tamerlane in just 2(!) paragraphs (pp. 275):"The alternative to capitalist-financed warfare was either simple coercion- the forced impressment of warriors without pay- or tribal musters fueled by promises of booty. Both systems could result in enormous and spirited armies: Vercingetorix's quarter-million-man Gallic army that nearly defeated Caesar at Alesia (52 B.C.) and the nomadic invasions of Genghis Khan (1206- 27) and Tamerlane (1381- 1405), who overran much of Asia, are the most notable examples. Cetshwayo, as we shall see, mustered 20,000 Zulus, who massacred the British at Isandhlwana (1879). But even the most murderous hordes could not really sustain- feed, clothe, and pay- a military force with sophisticated weaponry for a lengthy period of time. At some point farmers, traders, and merchants do not work if they are not paid, and standing armies are nearly impossible to maintain without regular salaries and contracts for supply.For those states, ancient and modern, that failed to adopt the tenets of capitalism and private enterprise, if they were to war long enough, they would eventually encounter Western armies that were supplied by an amoral and unfettered market. In such cases, the numbers, brilliant leadership, and battlefield courage of the Other could be nullified by smaller, even poorly led armies that were better fed, equipped, and armed by those who saw profit in war."So Hanson, who specialises in classical history, thinks that the armies of Greece & Rome ran on capitalism and private enterprise?!?!Nor does he provide any examples that non-Western armies were significantly worse provisioned than Western ones (again a highly dubious claim for any era prior to at least the early modern one, with the Roman legions as a probable exception).Hanson also simply adopts the "traditionalist" version of the innumerable "steppe horde" overwhelming "the West" by sheer numbers, as also seen by his ludicrous claim in the same section about Vercingetorix's "quarter-million-man Gallic army that nearly defeated Caesar at Alesia (52 B.C.)"... A quarter of a million men?!?!? Eh, has Hanson ever heard of fishermen's tales?In fact, exactly because the Mongols were steppe nomads, it's quite unlikely that the actually outnumbered their opponents (nomad populations are usually far smaller than sedentary agriculturalists, such as Hanson's "Westerners"). Indeed, the Mongols certainly adopted a both pitiless, rational and effective method of warfare (demonstrating that surrender meant clemency, resistance certain death, willingness to incorporate Chinese and Persian administrators and siege engineers, a professional and meritocratic officer corps etc.). This would place their way of warfare as far more "Western" than that of the European armies they defeated.Given all of these problems, why should you bother reading "Carnage and Culture"?1) It is useful as a thought-provoking op-ed of the early 2000s, and thus as peek into that era - just not for its insights into the history of warfare, or the rise of the "West".2) Its provocative thesis and selective use of historical evidence may (hopefully) lead unconvinced readers to study the subject in more depth on their own (as with Niall Ferguson's revisionist/apologetic works om Western/British imperialism). Being challenged is, after all, a good motivating factor.
At first I thought I did not like this book because to put it bluntly I don't like the inherent right wing politics of the book. In the end though it is just a really badly structured and I suspect edited book that often repeats itself in flabby prose that makes me not like it.The format of the book is too look at 7 battles that best distinguishes the peculiar nature and superiority of Western warfare. The West won, not because of necessarily superior weaponry, but a spectacularly effective war culture.Lets name these traits so you don't have to read the book. The author does however virtually repeats the same mantra when he discusses each battle.1) A citizen soldiery. By this he means a couple of things. Western soldiers were not arbitrarily treated as if they had no rights. There were regulations describing there rights and responsibilities. They were part of a society that was a democracy and/or had clear constitutional outlines of the duties between the ruled and the rulers . They were not owned by their kings or Emperors.2) A tradition of frontal shock tactics that often turned into battles of annihilation.3) Disciplined massed shoulder to shoulder infantry tactics. The emphasis being on not breaking the ranks.4) A tradition of empirical argument and reason that when applied to warfare meant that lessons were learned and decisions discussed to the point of violence between not only between officers but between offices and soldiers and not only between officers and officers and soldiers and soldiers but also the society in general. 5)Capitalist systems with governments that respected private property and the acquisition of wealth and property.The interaction between these cultural norms born in antiquity with the Greek city states lead to decisive victories and domination of the non western world. My problem is that I, as an averagely intelligent reader, can see other battles or wars that did not turn out so well for western democratic capitalist societies. The French in Algeria and the Dutch in Indonesia for instance. Why did the Turks beat back the democratic citizen soldiers of the allies in the Dardanelles campaign in World War One? What about the peak of the British Empire being a time of impressment in the Royal Navy? As for his awful right wing analysis of the Vietnam war... well it almost discredits his other history. He does in the end convince me though that dynamic constitutional societies when they make war are peculiarly efficient at it.
What do You think about Carnage And Culture: Landmark Battles In The Rise Of Western Power (2002)?
The very interesting verse with a very controversial premise - exploring "why the west has won" - militarily.Other books have been written which try to attribute their success to geography or natural resources or disease or technology. But this author makes a bold claim that Western military success can be attributed to their culture. He gives full credit to the bravery, genius, heroism, and physical strength of the armies that lost in battle to dominant Western powers over the last 2500 years. But starting with Greece and continuing through the histories of Rome, France, Spain, Italy, Britain, and the United States, He highlights certain cultural characteristics that were common to all of these western armies. The citizenship and freedom of individual soldiers made them more loyal and determined. Their preference for direct and decisive battle led to clear victories. Their democratic states were able to conscript large, willing armies. Their heavily armed, disciplined, and well organized infantry worked together as one unit, protecting each part. Their free-market capitalism produced innovative weapons. Their individualism allowed for creativity, flexibility, and spontaneity. And their habit of self critique allowed them to fix their mistakes and win over their enemies through culture. The author does not claim that western armies were stronger or smarter or braver. But the way that they organized their society gave them certain advantages on the battlefield. Definitely interesting read!
—Tim
This book is drivel, plain and simple. Hanson selects nine battles from history and pairs them with what he imagines to be the characteristics of Western civilization that, when combined in a test tube, have proved to be an elixir of invincibility, carrying the world before them.The Greeks defeated the Persians in 480 B.C. The lesson? A free citizenry was decisive in the conflict. Unfortunately, the slave laborers and women who were considered little more than property and who underpinned the ancient Greek economy would probably beg to differ with Hanson's definition of "free". Perhaps he only had men in mind? Hanson's choice of battles is quite arbitrary, and, echoing the Downing Street Memos, he has selected the facts to fit his thesis. If Alexander's victory at Gaugamela illustrates the West's penchant for annihilation, and Charles Martel's victory at Tours shows the superiority of the West's traditional dependence on fortified infantry, what of the obliteration of nearly the entire Roman army by an all-cavalry force at Adrianople in 378?Perhaps the Goths who destroyed Valens and his army were not Eastern enough for Hanson's thesis. How about the Huns in the fifth century? What of the Mongol empire of the 13th century (rulers of the largest land empire the world has known)? Genghis Khan's troops were all cavalry, they were not capitalists, they were very low-tech, not concerned with reason or philosophical discourse--in short, they were lacking just about all of the classically liberal virtues that Mr. Hanson seems to think essential for conquest. Of course, they possessed a knack for annihilation and great discipline, but then, hasn't every great army throughout history had those same qualities?Hanson's use of the Battles of Rorke's Drift (1879) and Tenochtitlan (1521) as examples of Western superiority is particularly illuminating. When a relatively technologically advanced civilization comes into contact with spear-throwing primitives with no biological immunity to say, smallpox, is that really evidence of the inherent superiority of Western civilization, or merely circumstances working out in our favor?The fact that no civilization, Western or otherwise, has been able to truly subdue China (without itself being assimilated by the Chinese), which hasn't (and doesn't) possess many of Mr. Hanson's proposed Western virtues, seems to argue against his thesis. The fact that the coming centuries will likely be Sino-centric merits understanding and an explanation, one that Mr. Hanson is politically incapable of delivering, but that Mr. Darwin's thinking anticipated long ago.
—Justin
An excellent study of the Western way of war and how a 2500 year old culture has allowed Western armies to enjoy incredible successes. The ideas of individual liberty, open dialogue, technological innovation based on free inquiry, allowed Greeks, Macedonians, Romans, Franks, Spaniards, the Holy League, British redcoats, and Americans to defeat more numerous enemies and bounce back from devastating losses because of the principles of a free citizenry.Hanson doesn't fall into the same trap as other authors and simply mark down Western successes to better technology or discipline, but goes to the root of these principles—primarily individual self-worth, free inquiry, and dedication to a mission. He rejects ideas that biological determinism allowed Western fighters to be better, and admits the failures of the occasional Western powers. Many of the principles that define the Western tradition are not perfect, but they are much better than the alternatives seen in non-Western nations and cultures.
—John Pinegar
