A Savage War Of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (2006) - Plot & Excerpts
In A Savage War of Peace, Alistair Horne combines the disciplines of journalism and history to provide a broad, yet insightful account of the Algerian War of Independence. This synthesis allows him to step outside of the strict boundaries of history and frame his narrative around the idea of “turning points” in the history of the conflict, which enables him to speculate, particularly in the conclusion, about what the outcome might have been had the situation changed. Aside from this, however, his chronicle is relatively straightforward, alternating between Algerian and French perspectives of the war and chronicling the most significant events.Horne’s first three chapters establish the historical context, beginning with the lead-up to the French occupation of 1830 and the rise of the pieds noirs, or European colonizers, in the country. Most of these pieds noirs were not actually French, but they were nonetheless privileged over the Muslims, while the Algerian Jews, who constituted a fifth of the non-Muslims, were underprivileged and would end up being caught in the middle of the conflict, even though they were granted automatic French citizenship. A series of unsuccessful reforms to raise the status of the Muslim population, who were not permitted to become French citizens unless they renounced their culture and suffered disproportionately during World War II, led to Ferhat Abbas’ declaration of a “Manifesto of the Algerian People”. In response, the French government promised equal rights and more governmental representation, but by this point the population was skeptical of such pledges that were, in any case, insufficient. National resistance emerged from French educational institutions and was emboldened by the failure of the French to hold their possessions in Indochina. By 1951 the blatant rigging of elections led the indigenous population to distrust any governmental interference on their behalf and catalyzed the formation of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and its declaration of a nation-wide revolution to begin November 1, 1954.Choosing All Saints Day for its symbolic meaning, as well as the likelihood of a more thinly-spread police presence, the first day of the Algerian War of Independence was one of both successes and failures of the FLN. This led the authorities to believe that the actions were less serious than they would turn out to be and could be put down easily. Furthermore, there was limited public interest in France, which contributed to a policy of initial repression. Although the first French campaign went poorly due to the FLN’s superior knowledge of local conditions and terrain, their successes were sufficient to weaken the FLN and allow the pieds noirs to continue with their normal lives. A subsequent change in government led to limited support for programs of reform that could have stopped the violence, which in turn engendered increasing cycles of repression and bloodshed. This was the hope of the FLN, who felt that such actions would rally support for the FLN from the uncommitted Muslim population and polarize the issue, a strategy that led to their first indiscriminate attack in the Philippeville Massacre. This became a turning point for the Governor General, Jacques Soustelle, who gave up on hopes of a compromise and ramped up his campaign of repression. It also helped internationalize the movement and, through the FLN’s participation in the 1955 Bandung Conference, earned them support and funding. Yet it also created a rift within the FLN, between those who believed in maintaining the current strategy (which included gruesome killings against the uncommitted) and those who that the rural population should be convinced of a better life rather than terrorized into joining the cause. The group as a whole, however, rallied around Ramdane Abane, who was neither Marxist-Leninist nor fundamentalist Muslim and was the first to think about the Algerian state after the revolution. He helped found the Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA), which allowed the FLN’s political faction (rather than its military one) to run the group’s operations.The FLN’s next objective was to open a “second front” in Paris, while at the same time the pieds noirs began to believe that they would have to take matters into their own hands in order to ensure a continued French presence in Algeria. The increased cycles of violence, meanwhile, culminated in the 1956-1957 Battle of Algiers, which was in large part a lengthy series of indiscriminate FLN terrorist attacks that the French military attempted to stop at all costs. This included the liberal use of institutionalized torture, which leads to one of Horne’s largest “what if” scenarios. Without torture, the FLN network in Algiers would not have been dismantled and they might have won the battle, perhaps shortening the war by several years, yet torture also provided the FLN with a weapon of discourse that, in the long term, worked in their favor. Nevertheless, the French Army did win the battle, which boosted their popularity of the military. The FLN, meanwhile, needed a new strategy and to regain the support of the Muslim population, but the military’s use of torture also won the FLN new liberal allies in France. The ultimate result of the FLN’s failure in Algiers was the overthrow of the political faction by the military one and the liquidation of Abadne.The situation between the pieds noirs and the civilian government, meanwhile, was growing tenser, while France found itself unable to form a government in France. This led to the demise of the Fourth Republic and the return of Charles de Gaulle to political life, who vowed to solve the Algerian crisis through reconciliation. The FLN, however, felt that his initial efforts towards this end fell short, so de Gaulle ramped up his military efforts while at the same time attempting to win the support of moderate Muslims. The weakened FLN, meanwhile, formed the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA), which was designed to gain support and bring together all factions of the movement. Secret negotiations between de Gaulle and Abbas failed to reach a solution, while new terrorist campaigns alienated the FLN’s potential French allies, even though they were now more careful about not targeting civilians.None of this, however, could prevent the militarization of the pieds noirs, who engaged increasing violence that culminated in the “Barricades Week”, where they occupied government buildings and held a standoff against the French military. De Gaulle waited the situation out, causing the movement to lose momentum, and eventually inspired the military to act forcefully to end the takeover. He remained ambiguous overall, however, about his feelings on Algerian independence. This led to a division within the FLN between hard-liners and negotiators, but the latter’s efforts to make peace were foiled, allowing the former to take control of the movement. The pieds noirs, meanwhile, formed a new group known as the Organisation Armee Secrete (OAS) to ensure that Algeria remained a French possession.tThe next major incident was the 1961 Algiers putsch, which was an attempt to overthrow de Gaulle and establish a military government. Although they disagreed initially as to whether their actions would be confined to Algeria or spread to mainland France, it was decided eventually to launch operations simultaneously, although only the Algerian mission was successful. Support for the coup d’état died quickly and, although it failed ultimately, it demonstrated to de Gaulle that Algerian integration was impossible. Yet the FLN continued to insist on a hard line, while negotiations in Evian were interrupted by continuous OAS violence in Algeria. With independence for Algeria imminent, the OAS’ goal became little more than frustrating de Gaulle and it made itself out to be a representative and protector of the non-militant pieds noirs. Although its activities were successful for a time, they lost support when one of their bombs severely injured a child in Paris.By this point the upsurge in OAS violence had led both de Gaulle and GPRA to desire negotiations over Algeria, with the former authorizing his agents to do whatever it took to reach an agreement. In retaliation, OAS declared total war, which enabled the violence to last long after French disengagement from the region, particularly as the Algerians did not have the structures in place to handle independence, and infighting soon absorbed the nascent government. Horne’s conclusion summarizes his book by examining numerous turning points and speculating upon the ways in which different circumstances might have affected the outcome. This deviates from historical methodology but nevertheless managing to recapitulate the salient points. Overall, A Savage War of Peace is a detailed, in-depth look at the Algerian War of Independence whose disparate disciplines are blended well to provide a text that is scholarly rigorous, engaging, and accessible. Although I have only read the first edition, updated versions have emerged that clarify some of the book’s uncertainties and make it an important read for anyone looking to better understand this conflict.
This is an excellent book, but a book emotionally difficult to read. A book filled with detailed information. A challenging book. It is thorough and well researched.It is balanced. All warring combatants are fairly presented.Details of the war atrocities, and they are numerable, are not excessive. This is what happened, and if you are going to read about this terrible war you need to be given all the facts, all the atrocities committed. Only then do you fully understand. Atrocities of war are committed by all involved. I love France, but I am not a French citizen. If you love a place you must also with clear eyes seek out all facets of its history - the good and the bad. What I learned shook me and made the book very difficult to read. When I read The Rape of Nanking, about the atrocities committed by the Japanese in 1937-1938, I found it a very important book and a book I wanted to support because the Japanese still today evade the truth. I was mad and my anger made it easy to support that book. But with Alistair Horne's book I was shaken because I had to open my eyes to the truth about a country I love. I still love France but all aspects of their historical past must be acknowledged too. The atrocities committed hit close to home. We Europeans are no cleaner, no more morally upright, equally culpable, and equally savage as the Japanese and the Arabs and other peoples. The atrocities committed during this war hit home because they are committed by people of a European culture, albeit not only them. The atrocities related in this book had to be detailed. The author is English. I am glad he was neither French nor Arab. He has gathered all the facts, the incriminating details, and presented them in a fair, balanced and nuanced manner.To understand what happened you have to understand the history that lead up to the Algerian War – a war of independence, a civil war and a war of terrorism. A war that lasted eight long years (1954-1962). The atrocities started before 1954 and continued beyond 1962. The book starts not in 1954, but in the 1830s when the French settled in Algeria. Algeria was a province of France. It was not a colony as Morocco and Tunisia were. It was as French as Brittany as Provence as Burgundy as Normandy. These people felt themselves to be as French as a Parisian! You have to understand this to understand why the French in Algeria could not give up what they saw as home. France’s war in Indochina, France’s occupation by the Germans in WW2, French involvement in the Suez conflict, the political events in France during the war years , are all covered to the extent to which they related to the Algerian War, as well as the burgeoning strength of the third world nations. Comparisons are made with the conflicts in Ireland and South Africa as well as independence and political development in Morocco and Tunisia. What has happened in Algeria and France immediately after the war is thoroughly covered, both specific individuals and political and economic developments. The book concludes in the 1990s.The narrator of the audiobook is James Adams, a British narrator who speaks clearly and with a steady, good speed. The French lines are clearly pronounced, albeit with a British accent. There are quite a few lines that are not translated, but they are not long sections. Comprehension of French is a plus. In that the book is so detailed, that so many Arab names are cited and that my own knowledge was so cursory when I began the book, I did find listening rather than reading challenging, but the narration is excellent. Thorough, well researched, balanced and emotionally engaging. This book in seven words. Not an easy read, but an important one.
What do You think about A Savage War Of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (2006)?
A solidly presented look at the conflict between Algeria and France leading to the former nation’s independence in 1962, in turns fascinating and frustrating — not because of the author’s efforts, although I will list a few quibbles below, but rather because of the lessons unlearned. In the preface to the 2006 edition, Alistair Horne relates that, at his staff’s request a copy of "A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962" was sent to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield in 2005. This would be around the time the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal was dominating headlines around the world, and Horne thought — at least — reviewing the French experience with torture in Algeria may prove useful. Unsurprisingly, given a propensity for arrogance that is the downfall of an otherwise brilliant mind, Rumsfield’s response was courteous but uninterested. That the Secretary of Defense’s staff wanted him to read the book is not surprising. Much as Bernard Fall’s "Hell In A Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu" became a hot commodity in the hands of U.S. policy and military types in Washington and Vietnam during the Battle of Khe Sanh in 1968, so too was Horne’s tome mined for information that would prevent a disaster during our failure to win the peace in Iraq following the 2003 invasion.A direct comparison between Algeria and Iraq simply can’t be made, however there are several striking similarities between the conflicts which Horne summarizes in the 2006 preface and careful readers will find for themselves throughout the text. History doesn’t often repeat itself verbatim, but some themes are universal enough that careful study by later leaders should lead to the avoidance of pitfalls. This conflict was indeed savage, with all the hallmarks of terrorism and brutality we have become all too familiar with in this day and age: Bombings, many aimed solely at civilians in both Algeria and France; assassinations; extensive collateral deaths of civilians during military operations; and the organized torture of suspects and prisoners. I was just six months old when the French flag was lowered for the final time in Algiers, so I found it interesting to learn more about this time period. Much was going on, from Dien Bien Phu and the Suez Crisis in 1956 (both had ramifications for the French military in Algeria) to the building of the Berlin Wall and its concomitant Cold War fears.Horne presents information in a non-linear way, shifting focus between the French and rebel FLN, but he carefully retraces his steps to cover bypassed events of importance. The first of three parts, which provides the exposition and context for the conflict as well as initial actions, is a bit of a slog. Once the stage is set however, the second (1954-1958) and third (1958-1962) parts of the book move crisply.Two other quibbles I had are the frequent use of French phrases, mostly in quotes, and a muddled conclusion. It is perfectly understandable that a book on a conflict where both sides used the same language would include statements in that language, and there is certainly something to be said for using verbatim quotes in the original tongue. However, in those instances I would suggest including an English translation; I don’t speak French and it was annoying to frequently shift from the text to Google Translate to ensure something important was not missed.The book has been revised twice (1996 and 2006) since being originally published in 1977, and the final chapter which summarizes the conflict and addresses post-war Algeria certainly bears the most obvious scars of these updates, with abrupt shifts in tone and content. It was as if instead of a complete re-write, the decision was made to simply tack on any additional information.As a side note, it was fascinating to read the three prefaces as each provides a snapshot of editorial style for the period. The original from 1977 is quite heavy and scholarly, with numerous sub-clauses while the later revisions are successively more direct and streamlined. I’m not sure if this is a function of the author or editor, but it was interesting to me.
—Scott Whitmore
This book, like all histories, has its biases and its imperfections. Despite that, A Savage War of Peace maintains a reasonable level of objectivity in relating the happenings of a war rarely described in neutral terms. For example, I say "a war," even though I was informed by a French colleague yesterday that many French historians prefer to avoid that word, choosing instead to refer to "the events" in Algeria. Such a position, I believe, illustrates clearly that even descriptions meant to appear prudent are in actually steeped in ideology and prejudice—how else could over seven years and (arguably) over a million casualties be considered simply "events?" This makes Alistair Horne's relatively fair account more admirable. Its limitations must be acknowledged—this is the work of a Francophilic Englishman, whose bias is towards recounting the maneuvers of great men. Still, where it succeeds, it does so brilliantly; it painstakingly states and restates what can only be described as fundamental misunderstandings by the French about the realities of their colonial government of Algeria, not to mention the motives of the various peoples who opposed them. And so I think two of this editions books blurbs are as germane as anything else that could be said:"Anyone interested in Iraq should read this book immediately."—Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post"[This] universally acclaimed history...should have been mandatory reading for the civilian and military leaders who opted to invade Iraq."—The Washington TimesBoth statements feel ominous on what might be the eve of air strikes against Libya.
—Jeremy Allan
This is not a book about Algeria. The author makes clear that he was unable to access decent sources from the Algerian side, but anyone buying this book should be aware that this is French history more than anything else. The author makes some efforts to understand the Algerians, but it often comes back to the same comments about their "inscrutable" nature. If you are looking for insight into Algeria, the wikipedia page would probably be about as useful.The treatment of the French, on the other hand, is superb. As an American, this is a whole era I had no awareness of. The fact that France was constantly at risk of military take-over during the eight year period this book covers was a revelation to me. France faced a lot of problems that I formerly associated only with third world banana republics. The book is about loss more than anything else. The French military is its most interesting protagonist. The French military's transition from world-spanning force, to a strictly continental one was much more traumatic than that of the British. Appearing to win the second world war, while also losing it, imposed all sorts of contradictions. The book makes a fascinating account of this breakdown.
—Robert Morris
