Bidault’s personal stake in a successful outcome in Indochina went deeper than anyone else’s, since he had been right there at the center when the crucial early moves were made, first as foreign minister in de Gaulle’s Provisional Government in 1944–45, then as president in the summer and fall of 1946. As foreign minister and then prime minister again in 1947–50, he had been uncompromising on the war—in the parlance of the later American war, a hawk among hawks—and he did not waver as defense minister in 1951–52. It’s a remarkable thing, in view of the dizzying turnover of governments in the Fourth Republic, that Bidault was seemingly always there, putting his stamp on the policy, pushing forward, ruling out compromise. This was Bidault’s war if it was anyone’s.Lately, though, the true believer had begun entertaining doubts, though he kept them mostly private. Still suspicious of negotiations, he felt pressure from the likes of former prime ministers Paul Reynaud and Edgar Faure to seek an early end to the war.
