Maquis groups further north did not attempt to attack such an overwhelmingly powerful force in unfavourable country. London had never expected that résistants would be able to achieve much against major formations in areas approaching the battlefront. The division was not even aware of the existence of the SAS detachment which caused the destruction of their petrol depot. To most of the men of the Das Reich, there was simply another of the interminable checks and delays which had wasted so much time since Montauban. Now, as the division approached the Loire, they entered the region of France in which most havoc was being achieved by the Allied communications bombing. ‘Our operations in Normandy’, wrote Rommel, ‘are rendered exceptionally difficult, and in part impossible to carry out, by the . . . overwhelming superiority of the enemy air force.’ Between 6 March and D-Day, the Allied air forces had poured 62,000 tons of bombs on to the ninety-three key rail centres chosen for attack by Eisenhower’s air and transport specialists.
