on Saturday, December 9, with Casey and Khalilzad on secure video. The general and the ambassador were scheduled to meet with Maliki the next day. They said they anticipated he would ask for additional Iraqi forces and more help from U.S. Special Forces. In addition, they said Maliki believed he was winning over Iraqi moderates. "Isn't it part of the deal for Maliki to go after Sadr?" the president asked. "He needs to go after him and say he's going after him." No, Casey and Khalilzad said. Maliki would say he was going after militias and those who break the law. He wouldn't single out Sadr, who still had ministers in the government and had been in a dialogue with Maliki at one point. Sadr and his Mahdi Army were too powerful. But Maliki would go after JAM under the pretext of going after the militias. This, in turn, would allow the United States to go after JAM and the militias. "How does this all differ from where we are now?" Bush asked. "The difference," Casey said, "is we're going to do it.
